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RECOVERY UPON ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS.

A very able opinion

by the Court of Appeals of New York, per Chief Justice Andrews,
deserves notice as an instructive addition to the development of the
doctrines of corporate power: Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy et al.,
45 N. E. 390 (1896).
The Bath Gaslight Co., a Maine corporation, leased its gaslighting plant, property and franchise to the United Gas and Fuel
Co., also a Maine corporation, for the term of twenty-five years at
an annual rent. Claffy became surety on a bond executed for the
faithful performance of the covenants in the case. The lessee
entered upon the property and operated the plant, but after paying
two installments of rent defaulted on a third. The rent remaining
unpaid, the lessor re-entered and took possession of the demised
property, under a provision of the lease. The lessor then brought
suit on the bond against the lessee and the sureties to recover as
damages the rent which remained unpaid; Claffy alone appeared,
and defended on the ground that the lease was ultra vires, illegal
209
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and void, because made without legislative sanction. There was
judgment for the lessor, Vann, J., dissenting in an elaborate
opinion.
The Chief Justice reviewed the doctrines of corporate power and
stated "the modern doctrine" to be "to consider corporations as
having such powers as are specifically granted by the act of incorporation, or as are necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect
He
the powers expressly granted and as not having others."
recognized that there are contracts which would be declared immoral
and unenforceable in the case of an individual, and that there are
also contracts in the case of corporations that are expressly proHe conceded that neither of these classes of contracts
hibited.
should be enforced by the court in favor of the corporation or
against it. While admitting that a corporation with public duties
to perform may not lease or otherwise part with its property and
franchises without legislative authority, he was nevertheless of
opinion that if such a lease by such a corporation is in fact made,
it is not "in any true sense of the word illegal," though it is
undoubtedly void as against the state.
Under the American doctrine of special capacities as quoted,
this lease was ultra vires, and on strict principle no suit could be
maintained on the contract; nor could any action in quasi-contract
be maintained against Claffy, a guarantor, for he had sustained no
unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court of the United States and
some state courts have refused to permit recovery on similar ultra
vires contracts upon the ground that to permit recovery in such
cases was in conflict with an alleged public policy. The New
York Court founded the right of recovery in this case on public
policy.
It is interesting to observe in the opinions filed here the two views
of public policy taken by the courts which respectively permit and
refuse recovery on ultra vires contracts. "Is there any public
policy," asks the Chief Justice, "which requires that the lessee
should be permitted to escape the obligation imposed by the
contract to pay rent reserved during the enjoyment of the property."
"Public policy is promoted by the discouragement of fraud and
Vann, J., in
the maintenance of the obligation of contracts."
dissenting, regarded the lease as opposed to public policy and
therefore void, because "it was beyond the corporate powers of the
lessor, and involved an abandonment of its duty to the public,"
citing inter alia the federal Supreme Court decisions holding this
view.
It seems to us, however, that a complete answer to the latter
position is found in the opinion of the Chief Justice: "But the
law affords ample public remedy for the usurpation by the corporation of unauthorized power, through proceedings by injunction or
for the forfeiture of their charters."
The opinion is interesting in another particular; it illustrates
the difficulty experienced by Courts in attempting to justify a
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decision upon principles of law which are in fact abandoned by
the decision itself. In reaching the sound result represented by
the decision of the Court, it is to be regretted that Chief Justice
Andrews did not emphasize the impossibility of reaching such a
conclusion upon any other theory of corporate power than the
common law theory of general capacities, not indeed as the theory
is applied in England, but in the sense that all such contracts,
whether executory or executed, will be enforced between the parties.
From the premises of the Chief Justice, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that no contract had come into existence in this case
on account of the lack of contractual power upon the part of the
lessor. But had the court boldly asserted its adherence to the
doctrine of general capacities-that a corporation has all the powers
Pf a natural person, but is restrained in the exercise of many of them
by the terms of its charter and the nature of its business-it could
have decided with unanswerable logic that the plaintiff in the case
at bar had indeed become a party to a contract which it could
enforce against the defendant, but that as respects the State it had
violated a provision in its charter for the breach of which the
State might make it answerable.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS BY STEAMBOTs-LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS. In the recent case of Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat
Co., 4S N. E. Rep. 369, the Court of Appeals of New York has
decided that a carrier of passengers by steamboat is liable as an
innkeeper, where money for travelling expenses is stolen from a
passenger's state-room at night, and without proof of the carrier's
negligence.
The Court, per O'Brien, J., said that "the traveller who pays
for his passage and engages a room on one of the modern floating
palaces that cross the sea or navigate the interior waters of the
country, establishes legal relations with the carrier that cannot well
be distinguished from those that exist between the hotel keeper and
The case is decided simply on this broad ground.
his guests."
No authority is cited to uphold the court's position, nor are the
cases holding differently referred to by it.
This case, it seems, is in conflict with the established rule, laid
down by the authorities, that carrier's are not liable as innkeepers.
The general rule as may be gathered from the decisions is, that
where the property is taken from a state-room or stolen from the
pocket of a passenger, in the absence of proof that the robbery
was committed by one of the employes, the shipowner will not be
liable : Clark v. Burns, i18 Mass. 275 ; The R. E. Zee, 2 Abb.
(U. S.) 49; Abbott v. Bradstreet, 55 Me. 530; Steamboat Crystal Palace v. Vanderpool, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 302 ; Afc.Mee v.
Owen, 15 (Mich.) 115.
INSURANCE. It seems to be fairly well settled that where an
insurance company issues a policy containing a condition, and at
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the same time has knowledge of facts which will vitiate the policy
if the condition be insisted on, in such case the company cannot
take refuge behind the stipulation and prevent the insured from
recovering on the policy. This rule was recognized in the recent
case of Graham v. American Fire Ins. CO., 26 S. E. Rep. 323.
The plaintiff had taken out a policy of insurance with the defendant
company on certain stock in a hosiery mill-loss payable to one
Tilton as his interest may appear-and the policy provided that the
insurance should be void if the assured was not the sole and unconditional owner of the property. It appeared that the plaintiff was
manager of this mill for Tilton, who was the real owner, under a
twenty years' contract, and that this fact was made known to the
agent of the insurance company before the policy was issued. The
property having been destroyed by fire, and suit being brought on
the policy, the insurance company contended that parol evidence
was not admissible to show that it knew of the plaintiff's title at
the time it assumed the risk. The court, however, admitted the
evidence, saying that such knowledge amounted to a waiver by the
insurance company of the condition in the policy.
This rule seems sound and in accordance with the weight of
authority, and is based on the reason that to allow the company in
such a case to insist on the condition would be to perpetuate a
fraud, for the company would thereby be enabled to issue
a policy and receive premiums thereon when it knew that the
insured could not recover in case of loss: Van Schoick v. Fire Ins.
Co., 68 .N. Y. 434; Casey v. Ins. Co., 66 N. W. 920; Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 45 P. 789 ; Ins. Co. v. Brown, 44 P. 35; Intl. Co. v. Kline,
32 S. W.
214; Ins. Co. v. Ward, 26 S. W. 763; Robbins v. Ins.
CO., 29 N. Y. Suppl. 513.
It would seem, however, that since waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known existing right, the court is not strictly
accurate when it says that the Insurance Company waived the condition. For when the contract was formed the insurer has no
rights against the insured. Such rights as it has are acquired under
the contract. How, then, can it be said that there is any waiver of a
right by the same act by which that right is created? To say so
would involve just as much of a contradiction as to allow the defense
contended for by the Insurance Company in the above case. The
true view in such a case would appear to be that there has been a
mistake; that this policy before the court does not express the real
intention of the parties and therefore parol evidence is admissible,
as Mr. Justice Miller says in Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wallace
222, not to contradict the contract, but to show that it may not be
lawfully used against the party whose name is signed to it.
LEASE-COVENANT TO REPAIR-DESTRUCTION
FIRE.
Wattles v. So. Omaha Ice and Coal

OF BUILDINGS BY

Coanany, Supreme
Court of Nebraska, 69 N. W. 785. The growing tendency exhibited of late by our courts to administer natural justice between
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suitors and to arrive at conclusions based on principles of honesty
and morality finds excellent illustration in the above case. The
facts were briefly as follows: In November, 1894, the defendant
had leased certain ice houses belonging to the plaintiff and situate
along the river front. He covenanted to keep the leased premises
in good repair, and at the end of the term to surrender their possession in as good condition as they were when he entered, natural
decay, wear and tear alone excepted. During the term the buildings were destroyed and rendered entirely valueless by a "violent
wind storm or hurricane."
The lessor claimed that the above provisions of the lease amounted to a covenant to restore the buildings.
In passing on this case the Supreme Court of Nebraska reviews the
authorities very carefully and the decision may be taken as a fair
index to the trend of judicial opinion on this mooted point.
In i Taylor on Land. and Ten., 8 Ed. 357, the rule is stated as
follows: "Where a tenant is under an express covenant to repair
premises he is liable for any loss or damage they may sustain and
must even rebuild in case of casualty by fire or otherwise."
In 12
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 721, the rule is thus stated : "The alterations in the tenant's liability for repairs, produced by his executing
a lease in which he makes an express covenant to repair, is so
marked that he becomes liable for all losses and damage the premises
may sustain, and must even rebuild in case of casualty by fire or
otherwise."
In Philli.psv. Stevens, i6 Mass. 238 (1819), the lessee
covenanted "that he would keep in repair, support and maintain
. . . the fences and building, saving and excepting the natural
decay of the same, as should be needful, at his own proper cost and
charge, and at the end of the term, . . . would quietly surrender,
leave and yield up, the premises in the same condition" they were
at the date of his lease. The buildings on the leased premises were
destroyed by fire, without the fault of the lessee and the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in construing the covenant in the lease,
held it was a contract binding the covenantor to restore the burned
buildings. The same conclusion on precisely similar states of facts
was reached in the following cases, all of which seem to recognize
the authority of Phillips v. Stevens: Beach v. Crane, 2 N. Y. 87;
Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416; -Ely v. Ely, 80 Ill. 532;
Davis v.
Ryan, 47 Iowa, 642.
In the case under conisideration the court said that the decision
in Phillips v. Stevens, relied upon by the courts in New York, California, Illinois and Iowa, seems to be based on the principle that
when once a man "has by his own contract . . . created a duty
or charge upon himself he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have
provided against it in his contract."
"This principle," says the
court, in what seems to be a perfectly just criticism, "is at best,
only a rule of construction ; at all times the intention of the parties
should govern."
"Repair," says the court, "means to restore an
existing thing. Were the construction contended for in this case
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correct; had this entire tract of lands and buildings been swept
away by a flood of the Missouri River the lessee would be liable for
their value."
(This was substantially the state of facts in Waite
et al. v. O'Neill et al., 76 Fed. 40 (1896), in which it was decided
that the lessee was not liable.)
"Before we impose any such risk
on him, we must first find his assumption of it in clear and unmistakable language."
The following are some of the authorities supporting the court's position: In the case of Pollard v. Schaffer,
i Dall. (Pa.) 210, the defendant had covenanted to keep the
demised premises in good repair, and in excuse for not so doing
pleaded that an alien enemy, to wit, the British army had invaded
the city of Philadelphia, and committed the damage complained of.
The court, in deciding that he was not liable for repairs, said, "A
covenant to do this against the act of God or of the public enemy
ought to be so clear and express that no other meaning could be
put upon it."
See also Levi v. Deyers, 51 Miss. 5oi ; Warren v.
Wagner, 75 Ala. i88; Howeth v. Anderson, 25 Tex. 557; Warner v. Hichins, 5 Bush; Waincol v. Silvers, 13 Ind. 497.
These cases all seem to point to the one conclusion, viz., that in
order to bind a lessee to restore building destroyed by casualty
beyond his control, a mere covenant in general terms to repair,
or to return the premises in as good condition as they were at the
beginning of the term, is not sufficient. There must be an actual
covenant in express terms to that effect. If we admit, as we must,
that the intention of the parties should be the controlling element
in determining their liabilities towards each other, this conclusion
seems a just one, because it cannot be reasonably supposed that
there was at the execution of the lease, any intention that the lessee
should be bound, in case of damages arising without his fault,
through casualty, inevitable accident, or the act of God.
ORPHANS'

COURT

SALE-JURISDICTION-COLLATERAL

ATTACK.

Reese v. Wi71dman, 35 Atl. 1047 ; 39 W. N. C. 193. Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.
The above decision unsettles, to a great degree, the conclusiveness, in other courts, of an Orphans' Court decree of sale of
decedent's lands for the payment of debts.
The facts were that one S. died in 1862 seized of a farm, and
leaving heirs. A sister had lent him $500, which he had used in
purchasing said farm. For this money he gave no security. At
S.'s death such of the children, as were of age, made some arrangement with their aunt by which she took the farm in payment of her
death. When she came to sell it, the purchaser objected to the
title as two of the children were still minors and their title outstanding. To remedy this defect, an administrator was appointed
in r872, who applied for leave to sell, for payment of the debt of
$500.
The debt had been meantime barred by the statute of
limitations and by operation of the Act of 1834, February 24 th.
Without inquiry as to the time of S.'s death or of the creation of

NOTES.

the debt, the Orphans' Court ordered a sale and confirmed the
same. The plaintiffs now claim in ejectment by descent and by
operation of the Act of 1834. The defendants reply by asserting
the conclusiveness of the Orphans' Court's decree.
The court held that the sale might be thus impeached in the
Common Pleas many years after it had been made. The ground
of the decision was that, as the Orphans' Court has only power to
sell land for the payment of debts, and, as, in this case, there were
no debts, there was nothing which could give the court jurisdiction
of the case. In other words, the court took the view that the
existence or non-existence of debts instead and not the existence
or non-existence of debts as found bj, the Orphans' Court, was a
jurisdictional fact.
This decision, as is pointed out in an able article by Judge Penrose
of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, in 53 Legal Zntell'gencer,
483, assumes that debts cease, as a matter of law and absolutely,
to be a lien after five years. The lien is not, however, so limited.
The Act of 1834, February 2 4 th provides:
SEC. 24. "No debts of a decedent except they be secured by mortgage
or judgment, shall remain a lien on the real estate of such decedent
longer than five years after the decease of such debtor, unless an action
for the recovery thereof be commenced and duly prosecuted ....
within five years after his decease, or a copy or written statement be
filled with the prothonotary, etc. .... "
The language of the act makes it clear that the question whether
a lien exists is one of fact, not of law; and to the Orphans' Court
is given exclusive jurisdiction to find that fact. It is the duty of
the court to determine whether there be debts, in a given case, and
further, whether such debts can be satisfied out of the personalty,
and whether they are a lien on the realty proposed to be sold.
It is clear that if the court has not jurisdiction to determine
these matters, it cannot order a sale. Further, to give the court
jurisdiction, it is not necessary that a schedule of debts be made a
part of the petition for sale; the only requirement is that such a
schedule should be exhibited: Stiver's App., 56 Pa. 9, (1867).
Though the petition to the Orphans' Court in this case did not
include all the facts, yet this amounts merely to an irregularity,
which, as has often been held, would be cured by final decree:
Polls v. Wght, 82 Pa: 498, (1876) ; Shoenberger's Est., 139 Pa.
132, (189o); Gilmore v. Rodgers, 41 Pa. 12o, (1861).
It is apparent from what has been said above that the existence
of a lien is as much a question of fact as the existence of the debts
themselves. If, then, there was an error in the Orphans' Court
through insufficiency of evidence, the only remedy was by opening
the decree by bill of review, or by appeal. Until the successful
termination of such action the decree was entitled to the respect of
other courts and could not be impeached collaterally.
Since the proceeding in this case was in accordance with the
provisions of the law, as was said by Chief Justice Sterrett in his
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strong dissenting opinion, '-the maxim 'omniapraesumun/ur rte
esse acta, donec probetrin contrarium'" applied, "and nothing
but want of jurisdiction, apparent on the face of the record, or
fraud, is recognized as a basis of question: " McPhersonv. Cunliff,
All of the cases relied on by the
ii S. & R. 422, (1824).
majority of the court seem to come within this rule: Grier'sApp.,
ioi Pa. 412, (1882) ; Torrance v. Torrance, 53 Pa. 505, (1866).

The decision certainly casts doubt on the rule as to collateral
attack on Orphans' Court sales, and, as the dissenting judges say,
will "seriously cripple an important branch of Orphans' Court
jurisdiction, unsettle many titles, bought for value in good faith,
and bring a flood of litigation."
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. The case of Smith v. Times Publishing
Co. et al, 178 Pa. 481 (decided Jan. 4, 1897), was the occasion
of the first exercise by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of the
authority vested in it by the Act of May 20, i891, Sec. 2, to
"order a verdict and judgment set aside, and a new trial had."
The plaintiff had obtained a verdict of $45,000 in an action of
trespass for an alleged libel published in the Times, and on a
refusal to grant a rule for a new trial, the defendants had appealed
assigning for error, in/er alia, that the verdict was excessive. The
judges were unanimous for reversal but differed considerably in
their views.
Mr. Justice Mitchell rested the right of the Supreme Court to
review the action of the jury directly upon the above mentioned
Act, and as it was attacked as being in violation of the provision of
the constitution of Pennsylvania, that "trial by jury shall be as
heretofore and the right thereof remain inviolate," he examined
the jury system to determine what are its essential features. He
decided that "the Act of 1891 makes no change in the trial itself,
nor does it deny the right. All that it does is to provide for
another step between verdict and final judgment, of exactly the
same nature and the same effect as the long-established power of the
lower courts. The authority of the common pleas in the control
and revision of excessive verdicts through the means of new trials
was firmly settled in England before the foundation of this colony,
and has always existed here without challenge under any of our
constitutions. . . . The Act of 1891 vests a further power of revision,
of the same nature, in this court. . . . It is a power of review only,
before final judgment, and does not violate the right to a jury trial
or even interfere with it in the particular case more than was or
might have been done by the court below."
Mr. Justice Williams also reviewed the history of trial by jury
and came .to the conclusion that the appellate court as well as the
trial court possessed the power of setting aside an erroneous
verdict. He said that this method of granting a new trial had
superseded the more summary process by way of fine and imprisonment of the jury, which itself was the successor of a direct proceed-
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ings against the members of the jury to attaint them for their false
verdict. IIThe exercise of this power was then thought to be in
aid of trial by jury."
"This practice, with which the colonies
were familiar, has continued in the courts of the states and of the
United States in some form down to the present time and is as
indispensable to the proper administration of justice now as it was
in the days of Lord Mansfield."
His Hono- then stated that the
tendency of modem times had been to restrict the exercise of this
power of review on the part of the Supreme Court to cases where it
was alleged that the trial court had abused its discretion as to granting or refusing a new trial, and it would not exercise this right upon
an appeal without such allegation; that as suitors were disinclined
to allege such abuse on the part of the trial court, this power was
not often invoked, but that "the Legislature of this state seems to
have been of the opinion that the power of revising the exercise of
discretion is not only constitutional but desirable."
He further
said that "in the Supreme Court of the United States the power of
an appellate court to reverse and order a new trial for excessive
damages is recognized."
in support of this position he cited
IZennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22 (1888); Hopkins v. Orr, 124
U. S. 510 (1887) ; Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mamnn, I3 o U. S. 69
(x888).
A careful examination of these cases will, it is believed,
show that they do not sustainithis statement.. In Kennon v. Gilmer,
13i U. S. 22 (1888), the only question before the court was
whether the Supreme Court of the territory of Montana acted
correctly in ordering a judgment to be reduced by almost one half
and then affirming it for that amount. Mr. Justice Gray said that
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
was in force in the territory; that in accordance therewith the
Code of Civil Procedure of Montana provides that "an issue of
fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is ordered by consent of the.parties; " and that that code
authorized the court in which a trial is had, or the Supreme Court
of the territory on appeal, to set aside a verdict and grant a new
trial "for excessive damages appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice."
He then expressed himself
as follows: "Under these statutes, as at common law, the court,
upon the hearing of a motion for a new trial, may, in the exercise
of its judicial discretion, either absolutely deny the motion, or
grant a new trial generally, or it may order that a new trial be had
unless the plaintiff elects to remit a certain part of the verdict, and
that, if he does so remit, judgment be entered for the rest: Hfopkins v. Orr, 124 U. S. 51o; Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Ifann, 13o
U. S. 69."
This statement as to the powers which the court of the Territory
might exercise under the Code was clearly obiter dictum, and
further, the cases which the learned Justice cites in support of his
views are not at all in point. ffopkins v. Orr, supra, decided that
the Supreme Court of New Mexico was authorized to affirm the
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judgment rendered by the District Court upon the general verdict
for the plaintiffs, and to make its affirmance conditional upon the
plaintiffs' remitting part of the interest awarded below, since it
appeared from the record that the computation of interest had been
usurious. Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, supra, decided that if the
trial court makes the decision of a motion for a new trial depend
upon a remission of the larger part of the verdict, this is not a reexamination by the court of facts tried by the jury in a mode not
known at the common law; and is not a violation of the Seventh
Amendment.
Since the Seventh Amendment is in force in the Territories, their
statutes would be pronounced unconstitutional if they really purported to confer the power on their appellate courts which they
are said to do in the obiter remarks of Mr. Justice Gray, quoted
supra, for the federal Supreme Court has always consistently declined to exercise the power to re-examine the findings of the jury
as opposed to the Seventh Amendment: see Parsonsv. Bedford,
3 Pet. 433 (1830) ; The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274 (1869) ;
Insurance Co. v. Constock, 16 Wall. 258 (1872) ; R. R. Co. v.
.Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24 (1879) ; Wabash R. ?. Co. v. MAfcDaniels,
107 U. S. 454 (1882) ; Wilson v. Everett, 139 U. S. 616 (i8go);
,Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76 (189o) ; Erie -?.R.
Co. v. Winter, 143 U. S. 6o (i89i). Those statutes are open,
however, to a narrower construction, namely, that they only declare the power of the appellate court to reverse or modify the
judgment of the lower court for errors appearing on the record.
Mr. Justice Williams evidently considered the obiter dictum of Mr.
Justice Gray to be the decision of the court in Kennon v. Gilmer,
supra, and then followed the learned federal judge in citing the
two cases relied on by him.
The narrower construction of the acts of the Territories, suggested above, was applied by Mr. Justice Sterrett to the Pennsylvania Act of 1891. He thought that the Supreme Court had never
had the power to re-examine findings of fact and that the Legislature had indicated no intention in the Act of i891 to confer it.
He considered the Act merely declaratory of powers that could
have been exercised without it, and, therefore, entirely constitutional. He was in favor of reversing on the ground that there had
been a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the court below.
Mr. Justice Dean was thoroughly opposed to tampering with the
verdict of the jury. He urged the objection that an appellate
court is not in a position to tell what the jury should have done
since, unlike the trial court, it has not heard the testimony upon
which the verdict is founded. He thought that at common law
the power of revision of verdicts had been confined to the trial
court, and was only rarely exercised, while in Pennsylvania it had
never been claimed or used by the Supreme Court. In support of
the latter part of that statement he cited the following cases:
Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dallas, i6o (1792 ) ; Moser v. Afayberry,
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7 Watts, 12 (1838); Gaskellv. M4orris, 7 W. & S. 32 (1844) ;
Hamet v. Dundass, 4 Pa. 178 (1846); Faunce v. Leslie, 6 Pa.
121 (1847); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Allen, 53 Pa. 276 (1866) ; Pa.
R. R. Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329 (1869); Gray v. Commonwealth, 10l Pa. 380 (1882) ; R. R. Co. v. Spinker, 105 Pa. 142
(1884); AfcXeenney v. Fawcett, 138 Pa. 344 (1890).
In the face of this line of authorities it would seem difficult to
escape the conclusion that it was the settled opinion of the court,
prior to 1891, that it did not have the power now in dispute. The
learned Justice then said that when there have been several constitutions in a state, the nature and extent of the right of trial
by jury must be determined by the practice before the last one,
and he referred to Byers &' Davis v. Com., 42 Pa. 89 (1862) ;
ynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378 (1856) ; Trigally v.
If, then, this be the meanAfayor, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 382 (1869).
ing of the words " trial by jury shall be as heretofore," and the
Act of 1891 be construed to give this power to the Supreme
Court, which is prohibited by the constitution, Mr. Justice
Dean has made out a strong case against the statute. But,
in the first place, it can be contended that the provision in
the present constitution referred back to the state of things existing in England before any of the Pennsylvania constitutions were
adopted, and the fact that the language of the constitution of 1776
was "trials by jury shall be as heretofore" and that of the constitutions of 179o and 1838 was identical with that in the present constitution, lends plausibility, to say the least, to the argument. If
this position be admitted it becomes important to find out what was
the rule at common law, and on this point Story, J., says in Parso's v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830) : "The only modes known to
the common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a
new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the
record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de
novo, by an appellate court, for some' error of law which interSee, also, Miller, Constitutional Law,
vened in the proceedings."
495, and cases cited. In the second place, there remains the
narrower construction of the Act, already referred to, and towards
which Mr. Justice Dean himself inclined, by which the Act is
regarded as merely declaratory and, therefore, constitutional.
In the following states there are statutory provisions similar to
the Pennsylvania Act of 1891: Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri,
Kansas, Arkansas, Indiana, Nebraska, Iowa; and their courts have
all exercised without comment or discussion the power of revision
conferred on them,-see: Waterman v. Chicago &' Alton R. R.,
82 Wis. 613 (1892) ; Gunderson v. Northwestern Elevator Co.,
47 Minn. 161 (i8gi) ; Haynes v. Trenton, 1O8 Mo. 123 (1891);
Ucher v Oberlender, 5o Kan. 315 (1893) ; Fordyce v. Jackson,
56 Ark. 594 (x892) ; R. R. Co. v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 165 (1882) ;
Orleans Village v. Perny, 24 Neb. 831 (1888) ; Cooper v. L/ills
Co., 69 Iowa, 35 (1886).
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It remains to be noted that the provision of the Seventh Amendment that " no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the
common law" lays stress on the findings of the jury, while the
provision of the Pennsylvania constitution only preserves the institution of trial by jury and the right to it; there is thus great force
in the position of Mr. Justice Mitchell, supra. It need hardly be
added that the Seventh Amendment only applies to courts of the
United States so that the states can adopt any provisions that they
see fit in regard to trial by jury in civil cases.
In view of this difference of opinion between the courts of the
states and of the United States, it will probably be thought that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has assumed and exercised a
dangerous power, and that Mr. Justice Dean was justified in recalling the familiar maxim that "Hard cases make bad precedents."
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

Certain individuals signed shipping

articles to perform the duties of seamen during the course of a
specified voyage, but becoming dissatisfied with their employment,
left the vessel. They were arrested under R. S. secs. 4596 to
4599, and committed to jail until the ship sailed (some sixteen
days) ; being returned to the ship, and refusing to "turn to" in
obedience to master's orders, they were again arrested at San Francisco for refusing to work in violation of R. S. sec. 4596, and were
held to answer such a charge before the District Court for N. D. of
California. A writ of habeas corpts was sued out and dismissed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision: Robertson, et al v. Baldwin, 1897 (not yet reported).
Mr. Justice Harlan filed a dissenting opinion, taking the ground
that the statutes under which the petitioners were detained conflicted with the constitutional inhibition upon involuntary servitude.
The majority of the court by Mr. Justice Brown suggested two
grounds for their conclusion: first, "Does the epithet 'involuntary' attach to the word ' servitude' continuously, and make illegal
any service which becomes involuntary at any time during its existence ; or does it attach only at the inception of the servitude, and
characterize it as unlawful because unlawfully entered into?"
The
court adopts the latter view. The second ground is that "If the
contract of a seaman could be considered within the letter of the
Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude."
Mr. Justice Brown reviews the law relating to seamen from the
time of the ancient Rhodians, and concludes that "in the face of
this legislation upon the subject of desertion and absence without
leave, which was in force in this country for more than sixty years
before the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, and similar legislation abroad from time immemorial, it cannot be open to doubt
that the provision against involuntary servitude was never intended
to apply to their contracts."
It is clear that this falls within a
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well known rule of construction. The language of the Thirteenth
Amendment was derived from the 6th Article of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 ; the Act of 1790, under a re-enactment of
which these seamen were imprisoned, applied to the Northwest territory, and it cannot be supposed that these statutes were deemed
inconsistent. The term involuntary servitude meant "such as
would not be tolerated by the free principles of the common law,"
(Cooley Const. Lim. 227), and became a part of the constitution
when the term had a definite meaning in American jurisprudence,
and when the obligations of seamen were well defined; it is too late
then to attempt to bring within its purview cases which were
regarded as distinct exceptions by those who framed the amendment.
Despite the dissenting opinion, it is clear that the court might
have rested its decision upon either of the foregoing propositions.
The dissenting justice objected to the first proposition on the
ground that service became involuntary " frm the moment (one) is
conpelled againsthis will to continue in such service; " he calls the
second proposition a piece of judicial legislation. As to his first
objection, it seems to overlook the fact that a contract of personal.
service knowingly and willingly entered into cannot be deemed
involuntary; nor can judicial legislation be said to result from the
only construction which without doubt was in the mind of the
framers of the Amendment. For both sides of the first proposition
see case of Mary Clark, i Blackf. (Ind.) 122 (1821), and Statev.
Williams, io S. E. (S. C.), 876 (i89o).

